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of the relevant factors. Thus the court found a regulation can only be
set aside if it is proved to be arbitrary or capricious, plainly transgresses
the statue it purports to effectuate, or alters the terms of the statute
and frustrates the policy embodied in it.
The court found DEP's adoption of LPM to delineate wetlands did
not flout the enabling statue or undermine the legislative intent.
Since DEP classifies wetlands supporting the habitats of threatened or
endangered species, the court noted that LPM broadens the inquiry to
include habitats of actual sightings or physical evidence of these
species, and contiguous wetlands that contain the natural
characteristics that make the wetlands suitable for species to populate.
The court held that because endangered or threatened species are not
stationary many rare species require continuous blocks of habitat.
Furthermore, rapid suburbanization of landscape could lead to the
loss and degradation of critically important wild life habitats. The
court concluded the adoption of a more protective approach through
LPM was neither inconsistent with governing statue, unsupported by
the record, nor arbitrary or capricious. Thus, the court concluded
that the adoption of LPM did not exceed DEP's statutory mandate.
D.M. Shohet

Manzo v. Mayor of Marlboro, 838 A.2d 534 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
2003) (holding township may enact ordinances using residential
cluster development to reduce pollution in nearby streams and
waters).
Rose Manzo and Morgan Estates ("Manzo") filed suit against
Marlboro Township ("Marlboro") challenging Marlboro's Zoning
Ordinance in the Monmouth County Superior Court. Manzo alleged
that (1) the Zoning Ordinance was inconsistent with the Township's
Master Plan, (2) the ordinance represented fiscal zoning, (3)
Marlboro improperly sought to reduce residential development
density, (4) the ordinance violated the Fair Housing Act by
discriminating against families with children, and (5) the means
Marlboro used to achieve its stated goal were unreasonable. The court
dismissed each of Manzo's claims.
The estate of Rose Manzo owned 167 acres of undeveloped land in
Marlboro. Manzo and Morgan Estates, L.L.C. ("Morgan Estates")
entered in an option agreement for Morgan Estates to purchase the
property by 1999. The property was divided into quadrants by streams,
ultimately running into Big Brook, which runs along the northern
boundary of the property. Until August 1999, the property was zoned
for lots of 30,000 square feet, similar to other properties in the area.
In the same month, Manzo and Morgan Estates executed the prior
agreement, and soon thereafter, Marlboro created a new zoning
district named the Stream Corridor Preservation Residential District-Il
("SCPRD-II"). The SPRCD-II required a minimum lot size of 80,000
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square feet and allowed some optional clustering provisions. This
amendment to the ordinance was the subject of Manzo's suit.
In order to assess the challenge to SCPRD-II, the court first
recognized the presumption of validity accorded municipal
The court then quickly dismissed four of Manzo's
ordinances.
contentions as irrelevant to the factual situation. Next, the court
evaluated whether Marlboro's purpose in adopting the ordinance
creating the SCPRD-I was reasonable and therefore valid.
Manzo first asserted that the purpose of the ordinance was to allow
Marlboro to limit the number of households, although Marlboro's
expressed purpose was to protect streams, particularly nearby Big
Brook. The court concluded that evidence such as the Township
Master Plan, the Township Planner, and Township Council minutes
supported Marlboro's stream-protecting purpose. The court further
identified New Jersey's legislation and a Municipal Land Law that
noted the correlation between residential and commercial
development and reduced water quality.
Manzo further requested the court to examine the means utilized
The court determined that
by Marlboro to support this goal.
Marlboro's ordinance exhibited a legitimate relationship to its
purpose because experts agreed that cluster developments allow less
land disturbance and less opportunity for pollution to reach waterways.
Concluding that the SCPRD-II cluster provisions supported Marlboro's
objective for less-polluted streams, the court dismissed Manzo's
complaint.
Becky Bye

OHIO
Witfoth v. Kiefer, No. L-02-1325, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 6766 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2003) (holding (1) no reasonable person could consider a
low yielding well a material defect or problem, (2) sellers need not
disclose low well yield on disclosure form, and (3) nondisclosure did
not amount to fraudulent concealment).
In 1998, Frank and Mary Witfoth filed suit in Lucas County Court
of Common Pleas against James and Kim Kiefer alleging fraudulent
representation and concealment arising out of the sale of the Kiefer's
home. The Kiefers disclosed a well supplied water to the home on the
sales disclosure form but made no indications about the condition or
yield of the well. Prior to purchase, the Wiffoth's professional home
inspector advised them to hire a specialist to measure the well's yield.
The Witfoths declined, trusting that the sales disclosure would have
indicated low well yield. After move in, the Wiffoths discovered the
water flow was insufficient for consecutive showers or loads of laundry.
A pump test later determined the well yield was 1.5 gallons per minute

